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1. The  Problem 
The process of European integration has reached a formerly unknown speed. The 
completion of the Internal Market has led to a mutual recognition or harmonization of 
varying standards, norms, and regulations among EU member countries. Moreover, the 
treaty of Maastricht widened the competences of the EU in various areas of economic 
policy. At the same time, the former EFTA-members Sweden, Finland, and Austria 
joined the European  Union; the Central and Eastern  European reform countries are 
willing to follow as soon as possible. Above all, the knocking-on-the-door of the 
young market-economies in Eastern Europe has raised the question, whether a widening 
of the integration area with countries that are lagging behind with regard to their 
economic development is in contradiction to a deepening of the European Union. 
Thus, this paper aims at discussing potential contradictions and alternative concepts of 
resolution. In a first part, it will be shown that the deepening of the EU has gone beyond 
the economic optimal degree and is, therefore, indeed in contradiction to a full 
membership of Central and Eastern European countries in the EU. Then, alternative 
concepts of an opening-up of EU-markets towards Eastern Europe will be discussed. 
2.  The Optimal and the Factual Degree of Economic Integration 
From a normative economic viewpoint, there is almost no contradiction between a 
deepening and a widening of an integration area. For economists, "deepening" means —
 above all — the implementation of the "four freedoms" in economic relations among 
member countries: The freedom of trade in goods, the freedom of trade in services as 
well as the free movement of capital and people across borders. Thus, a main instrument 
for the deepening of an integration area is the introduction of the country of origin-
principle. The country  of  origin principle has been mainly discussed with respect to 
turnover taxation within the EU. Under this scheme, exports are charged with the tax 
rate of the country of origin, imports are free of tax. The introduction of the country of 
origin principle leads to some sort of tax competition, because exporters in high-tax 
countries would realise a deterioration of their competitive position compared to 
exporting firms in low-tax countries. These changes in competition advantages might   - 2 -
influence the tax policy of member states, for countries with relatively high value-
added-tax (VAT) rates would lose tax revenue due to the decreasing foreign turnover of 
domestic exporters and the increasing direct purchases of private consumers. Hence, it 
can be expected that high-tax countries would reduce their VAT rates to prevent further 
revenue losses, while low-tax nations would gain fiscal space to increase VAT rates. 
This competition of locations would finally result in a competitive adjustment of VAT 
rates. 
An introduction of the country of origin principle in transborder trade between EU 
member countries would mean that all goods and services that are produced according 
to the norms, standards, and regulations of the exporting country can be freely shipped 
to any other member country of the EU. The resulting competition of locations would 
consequently lead to a gradual 'market-driven' harmonisation of differing norms, 
standards, and regulations between member states. In a similar vein, an introduction of 
the country  of  origin principle would result in a mutual recognition of workers' 
qualifications. 
In addition, the deepening of an integration area goes hand in hand with a transfer of 
certain economic competences from the national to the supranational level. It is 
important, however, that the resulting distribution of competences is based on the strong 
economic principle of subsidiarity. The main message of this principle is that a transfer 
of competences from a minor to a major political level always leads to a negligence of 
individual preferences.1 If all public services are supplied by a central government 
body, the height of the supply always reflects a compromise between varying needs of 
different groups of consumers. Thus, as a consequence of a transfer of competences in 
favour of the EU Commission, some groups of consumers become "forced riders", i.e., 
they are forced to consume a higher quantity of public goods and services than they 
prefer, while other groups of consumers will suffer from welfare losses because of an 
                                                 
1  See among others Klodt, Stehn et al. (1992); Stehn (1993c); Laaser, Stehn (1996).   - 3 -
undersupply with public goods and services.2 As a general rule, the strong economic 
principle of subsidiarity recommends that economic competences should be transferred 
to the lowest possible government body. Only if a transfer of competences to the 
supranational level leads to efficiency gains that exceed the welfare losses due to a 
centralization, national and regional responsibility should be replaced by supranational 
competences. 
Above all, a centralization of tasks within the EU promises to generate welfare gains if 
the public services and goods supplied by one member country can also be consumed 
by inhabitants of other member countries. In this case, there are — due to the existence 
of positive externalities  — no incentives for a sufficient decentralized supply. An 
important example for supranational public goods is the guarantee of the openness of 
markets within the EU, because free market access may generate gains for all 
inhabitants of the EU. The advantages of an international division of labour, the cost 
advantages of mass production and the dynamic incentives of a fierce competition may 
lead to welfare gains for all consumers within the EU. Thus, one fundamental task of 
the EU is the supervision of national subsidy programs in the framework of the aid 
supervision system and the merger control with respect to mergers and acquisitions that 
generate Europe-wide competition effects. 
Efficiency gains may also be realized by a centralization of competences in 
environmental policies, especially with a view to cross-border environmental damages 
due to air pollution or water pollution. Moreover, a transfer of certain competences in 
the area of research and development policy to the supranational level might be in 
accordance with the strong economic principle of subsidiarity. As empirical research 
indicates, basic research and development, especially with a view to high-technology 
R&D, can be expected to generate considerable cross-border spillover effects giving 
rise to an almost free dissemination of basic knowledge, because basic knowledge is 
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hardly codifiable and thus cannot be patented.3 In this case, cross-border externalities 
can lead to an underinvestment in basic research activities that can only be prevented by 
a transfer of responsibilities from the national to the supranational level. A transfer of 
further economic competences to the supranational level, however, is not in accordance 
with the strong economic principle of subsidiarity. 
Any deepening of economic relations among the member countries of the EU that 
follows the economic principles sketched above is in accordance with a widening of the 
integration area by the Central and Eastern European countries. The mutual opening of 
markets due to the introduction of the four freedoms in economic relations between the 
young market-economies in Eastern Europe and the old EU-members will deepen the 
division of labour and subsequently increase the income potentials within the enlarged 
Union; and a transfer of economic competences to the EU-level that follows the strong 
economic principle of subsidiarity will generate efficiency gains for old and new 
members. 
However, as it stands now, the integration process within the EU is by no means a 
mirror image of this normative picture. On the one hand side, the four freedoms are 
limited by the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) as well as the harmonization of 
norms, standards and regulations as a result of the Internal Market Program. On the 
other hand side, it is obvious that the EU has taken over competences in the framework 
of the regional and cohesion policy as well as the research and industrial policy that 
aggravate a full membership of countries that are economically lagging behind. It is 
thus this deepening of economic relations that goes beyond the economically optimal 
degree that generates contradictions between a deepening and a widening of the EU. 
Above all, there is a lively public and political debate about the participation of Central 
and Eastern European countries in the Common Agriculture Policy and the Common 
Cohesion Policy in case of a full membership in the EU. There are fears that a free 
                                                 
3   For an excellent survey of recent empirical studies on interregional knowledge 
diffusion see Paqué (1995).   - 5 -
access of the reform countries in Eastern Europe to the agriculture fund and the 
structural funds, which aim at promoting the development of backward regions within 
the Union, will lead to an almost unbearable financial burden for the old members of the 
EU. However, it is very difficult to calculate the costs of a full membership of Central 
and Eastern European countries in the EU with respect to their participation in 
agricultural and structural funds. Nevertheless, assuming that the distribution of funds 
stays unchanged after an enlargement of the EU, a tentative simulation can give some 
rough estimation of the potential costs (see Stehn, 1994b). The simulation is based on 
the assumption that per capita income in Central and Eastern Europe will double in the 
near future (basis year:  1989) and that the share of the agriculture sector in total 
production in the reform countries will decrease because of structural changes after an 
enlargement by about 25 percent. 
Based on these assumptions, the yearly net  costs of a full membership of Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovakian Republic, Bulgaria, and Romania in the 
EU will amount to roughly 11 billion ECU. Thus, a participation of Central and Eastern 
European countries in the Common Agriculture Policy and the cohesion and regional 
policy would lead to an increase in yearly expenditures for the agricultural and 
structural funds of about 18 percent and would amount to a share of 0.2 percent in the 
GDP of EU 15.4 
With a view to the current budget of the EU which amounts to roughly 1.2 percent of 
EU GDP, such an additional burden seems to be high, but not unbearable. Hence, a 
participation of Central and Eastern European countries in the agricultural and structural 
funds is more a problem of political economy than a problem of financial politics. There 
is the danger that considerable West-East-transfers will generate severe moral-hazard-
problems in Central and Eastern Europe which could — in the worst case — counteract 
                                                 
4   An alternative simulation of the CEPR (1992) that does not take into account 
possible structural changes after an accession of Central and Eastern European 
countries estimates the total costs of an Eastern enlargement to roughly 14 billion 
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the reform efforts in these countries (Welfens, 1993). Moreover, it is highly likely that a 
huge subsidy program in favour of Central and Eastern European countries would 
stimulate old members in Southern Europe to ask for additional regional subsidies. The 
new cohesion fund (volume 1994-1997: 15  billion  ECU) which aims at promoting 
infrastructure programs in member countries with a per  capita income of less than 
90 percent of the EU average, namely Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland, is a good 
example for the polit-economic processes in the EU because it can be regarded as a 
direct return for the agreement of South European countries to create a European 
Monetary Union. Under these circumstances, a full membership of reform countries in 
Eastern Europe in the EU seems to be possible only after a substantial reform of the 
agriculture and structural funds of the EU. 
Difficulties for a full membership of the young market-economies in Eastern Europe 
also arise from the Internal Market Program. Notwithstanding that high administrative 
hurdles hindered the EU-Commission to implement a harmonization of trade distorting 
norms, regulations and standards on a high level, the agreed upon social, environmental 
and technical basic norms have —  to a large extent  — reached a level that erects 
significant trade barriers for Central and Eastern European countries which can be 
climbed only under a lost of price competitiveness. A mutual recognition of norms and 
standards in these areas is, therefore, an important prerequisite for the integration of the 
reform countries. However, it is highly unlikely that the EU 15 will be ready to offer the 
new members such farreaching preferences. It is far more likely that the resistance of 
the richer countries in Western Europe against an introduction of a country of origin-
principle which could be observed in the course of the implementation of the 
Internal  Market Program and Maastricht negotiations, would increase in case of an 
accession of Central and Eastern European countries. Under these circumstances, it is 
highly likely that a full membership of the reform countries in the EU would result in 
re-negotiations of the Internal  Market  Program with the objective to intensify the 
harmonization efforts. However, this would be the worst alternative. 
Conflicts between a deepening and a widening of the EU could also arise in the area of 
research and industrial policy. With respect to the common research policy, there is a   - 7 -
longstanding debate about the implementation of fair criteria for the distribution of 
funds among the member states. One school of thinking argues that research funds 
should flow overproportionally to rich countries because these countries would realize 
the highest technological potential and subsequently the highest gains from research 
funds. Another school of thinking points to the fact that a distribution of funds in favour 
of rich countries would counteract the objective of the common regional policy because 
the implementation of a basic technological potential is a necessary prerequisite for a 
successful catching-up process of the less developed regions in the EU. An Eastern 
enlargement of the EU would — without doubt — strengthen these already existing 
conflicts. A similar conflict potential could arise in the area of industrial policies 
because those industries that are defined as future industries in the treaty of Maastricht 
can be found almost exclusively in the richer member countries. 
It is obvious that the deepening of European integration has gone beyond the 
economically optimal degree and thus erects high barriers for a full membership of 
Central and Eastern European countries in the EU. However, it is also obvious that an 
open access to the markets in Western Europe is an important prerequisite for the 
success of economic reforms in Eastern Europe because the EU is by far the most 
important export market for these countries. About 60 percent of all exports of Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech  Republic, the Slovakian  Republic, Bulgaria, and Romania are 
currently shipped into the Internal Market. This seemingly contradiction can only be 
resolved in the framework of an integration process that allows for varying speeds of 
integration and focuses on a stepwise integration of the young market-economies. Three 
alternative concepts that could be part of such a variable integration process will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
3.  Alternative Concepts of Integration 
a)  Integration by Association 
Preference- and association agreements with third countries have a long tradition as a 
trade policy instrument of the European Union. For example, the ACP countries are 
enjoying a special external tariff of the EU and the EFTA member countries have a free   - 8 -
access to the Internal Market in the area of manufacturing. First steps towards an 
association of Central and Eastern European countries with the EU have been made 
with the notification of the so-called Europe Agreements between Poland, Hungary, and 
(former) Czechoslovakia5 on the one hand side and the EU on the other hand side in 
December  1991 which were followed by association agreements with Romania and 
Bulgaria in 1993 and with the Baltic States and Slovenia in 1995. 
There is no doubt that the Europe Agreements are an important first step towards an 
opening of the European Internal Market for Central and Eastern European countries6. 
However, these agreements are by no means sufficient to offer the young  market-
economies in Eastern Europe an open access to the Internal Market. Above all, market 
access is limited in "sensitive" areas like agriculture, textiles, and steel. The share of 
these sectors in total exports of the Visegrad-countries into the EU currently varies 
between 30.5  percent in the Czech and Slovakian  Republic and 43.4  percent in 
Hungary. However, the limited market access for sensitive goods will lose importance 
in the medium term because it can be expected that the countries of the Visegrad-group 
will gain comparative advantages in the production of so-called "mobile 
Schumpeter  goods". These research-intensive goods are characterized by a distinct 
separation between the development of the production technology and the production 
process as such.7 Mobile Schumpeter  goods, such as automobiles, chemicals, or 
pharmaceuticals can thus be produced with imported knowledge which can be bought 
abroad. With respect to these mobile Schumpeter goods, the Europe Agreements offer 
an almost free access to the Internal Market for the Central and Eastern European 
countries. 
                                                 
5  After separation, the agreement was extended to both new countries. 
6  For a detailed analysis of the Europe Agreements, see Böhnlein, Heitger (1991), and 
Langhammer (1992). 
7  See Klodt (1987) for a detailed categorisation of mobile and immobile Schumpeter 
goods.   - 9 -
However, it is important to note that the Europe Agreements include a safeguard clause 
which can be used by EU member countries as a last resort instrument to leave the 
liberalization path if domestic suppliers suffer from increasing import pressure from 
Central and Eastern European countries. With a view to the defensive trade policy of 
the EU against import competition from South-East-Asian NICs in this area which is 
above all based on antidumping measures and voluntary export self-restraints, it can 
realistically be assumed that the EU member countries will make use of this safeguard 
clause. The imposition of countervailing duties on steel products from Eastern Europe 
during the last steel crisis also points in this direction. All in all, it can be feared that the 
safeguard clause of the Europe Agreements will play a similar role as Article XVIV of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which allows a departure from the 
most-favoured-nation-principle in case of "serious difficulties", but is abused in 
practical trade policies for protection purposes. 
Even under the rather heroic assumption that the member countries of the EU will not 
use the safeguard clause for industrial and regional policy purposes in the near future, 
the mere existence of this clause may be harmful for the economic development of the 
young market-economies. For potential investors, an open access to the EU Internal 
Market is an important prerequisite for a transfer of production locations towards 
Eastern Europe. If there is any doubt about the future development, they will highly 
likely prefer production locations in Portugal or Spain. Moreover, the safeguard clause 
of Article 30 Europe Agreements counteracts the basic objective of these agreements, 
namely to give incentives for economic reforms in Central and Eastern European 
countries. The young  market economies are also free to make use of the safeguard 
clause in order to protect their young industries against import competition from the 
EU. Strong economic interest groups in these countries might thus exert strong 
pressures on their politicians to make use of this protection instrument. 
Problems with respect to future economic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe also 
arise because the Europe Agreements do not include a mechanism that promotes the 
development of a free trade area among Eastern European countries (Baldwin, 1992). 
An association to the EU without the formation of a free trade area among the reform   - 10 -
countries offers production locations within the Union an artificial locational advantage 
vis-à-vis production locations in Eastern Europe (Stehn, 1994b). Association 
agreements between the EU and the Central and Eastern European countries can thus 
only reach the full liberalization potential when they are accompanied by a 
liberalization of East-East-trade. Up to now, all attempts to create a Central European 
Free Trade Area have failed on political grounds. The establishment of a free trade-area 
among Central and Eastern European countries should, therefore, be incorporated into a 
concept of integrating the reform countries into the EU. 
b)  The EFTA Option 
A participation of Central and Eastern European countries in the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and a widening of the current bilateral trade agreements between 
the EU and the old EFTA members towards the reform countries in Eastern Europe 
could contribute to mitigate the problems associated with the Europe Agreements. This 
integration step would offer the Central and Eastern European countries an open access 
to the Internal Market in the area of the whole manufacturing industry, without 
exemptions for sensitive sectors, and would at the same time build up a "safe harbour" 
for long-term investments in the area of mobile Schumpeter-goods against the safeguard 
clause of the Europe Agreements. Moreover, a full membership in the EFTA would 
raise the attraction of locations in Eastern Europe for mobile capital because this 
integration step would go hand in hand with a creation of Central European Free Trade 
Area. It should be noted, however, that even in case of a full membership in the EFTA, 
the Central and Eastern European countries would have no access to the common 
agriculture market of the EU. 
However, it can realistically be doubted that the EFTA option will lead to a sufficient 
integration of reform countries into their "natural" export market. An important barrier 
are the antidumping regulations of the EU which can be used against all third countries, 
even against associated EFTA  members. The antidumping regulations of the EU 
provide that countervailing duties can be raised against producers in third countries 
whose product prices within the Internal Market are below domestic prices or below 
production costs. Since the last criteria is used very often in practical trade policies,   - 11 -
these regulations leave a broad leeway for national discretion. As a general rule, 
antidumping measures of the EU lead to "voluntary" export self-restraints between the 
respective countries. There are currently about 50 export self-restraint agreements of the 
EU with third countries, with a tariff equivalent varying between 3  percent and 
50 percent and an average tariff equivalent of 15 percent.8 Antidumping measures have 
thus become one of the most important protection instruments of EU countries. About 
60 percent of these export self-restraints are focused against suppliers in South-East-
Asian NICs. It can thus be feared that in case of a membership of Central and Eastern 
European countries in the EFTA, antidumping measures will be used as a safeguard 
clause in the EU-EFTA Trade Agreement. 
An abuse of antidumping regulations as protection instrument against suppliers in 
Central and Eastern European countries could be prevented by a widening of the 
European Economic Area (EEA) towards Eastern European reform countries. In this 
case, the new members in Eastern Europe would have to adapt their competition law to 
the regulations of the EU and would thus be immune against antidumping measures 
initiated by old members. 
c)  The Widening of the European Economic Area (EEA) 
With the ratification of the agreement on the establishment of a European Economic 
Area, which came into force on January  1, 1994, all rights and obligations of the 
Internal Market Program of the EU were extended to the former EFTA members, with 
the exception of Switzerland. There is no doubt that an integration of Central and 
Eastern European reform countries into the EU  Internal Market would raise the 
attractivity of production locations in Eastern Europe. A study of Nerb (1988) which is 
based on a firm sample of 20,000 firms located in the EU shows that the variety of 
technical standards and regulations prior to the completion of the Internal Market raised 
the production costs of firms within the Internal Market by about 2 percent. Pelkmans, 
                                                 
8  For a comparison: The average external tariff rate of the EU only amounts to about 
5 percent. See Stehn (1993b).   - 12 -
Wallace, and Winters (1988) have estimated that even if all technical norms and 
regulations stayed unchanged the cost reductions due to the implementation of the 
country of origin principle would reach a level of 1 to 3 percent of intra-EU trade. In 
this case, producers could realise substantial economies of scale because they only had 
to take into account the norms and regulations of their production locations. In case that 
these estimations come close to reality, production locations within the EU will gain 
attractivity vis-à-vis competing locations in Eastern Europe. From this perspective, a 
participation of Central and Eastern European countries in the Internal Market is a 
necessary condition for the success of the reform processes in the young  market 
economies. 
It should be noted, however, that the cost reducing effects of the Internal Market 
Program heavily depend on an efficient implementation of the integration steps listed in 
the EU White Paper. The integration steps that have been undertaken up to now cast 
some doubts about the rather optimistic estimations that have been made prior to the 
implementation of the Internal Market Program, especially with a view to the transition 
system of turnover taxation in the Internal Market which might increase rather than 
decrease the costs of transborder trade within the EU (Stehn, 1994a). Thus, it is 
ambiguous, whether a participation in the Internal  Market Program would be 
advantageous for the reform countries in Eastern Europe. A participation in the Internal 
Market Program would, on the one hand side, raise the attractiveness of production 
locations in Eastern Europe, but would, on the other hand side, also result in an 
decreasing price competitiveness of domestic suppliers on foreign markets. However, it 
can be expected that those countries in Eastern Europe that have made rapid progress in 
structural change towards the production of technology-intensive Schumpeter-goods 
might rather gain than lose from a participation in the Internal Market. 
Above all, the countries of the Visegrad-group, perhaps with the exception of the 
Slovakian Republic which is still lagging behind with respect to the necessary structural 
adjustments, might gain from a widening of the European Economic Area because they 
might be in a position to take advantage from the dynamic effects of the Internal 
Market. These dynamic effects are a result of a fiercer competition due to the reduction,   - 13 -
mutual recognition, or harmonization of technical standards and norms. These dynamic 
effects are gaining importance with an increasing degree of monopolistic competition 
within the EU. Venables and Smith (1988) have shown that in this case even the 
reduction of quantitatively rather unimportant trade barriers lead to a significant 
increase in competition intensity and subsequently to a reduction of monopolistic 
market power. At the same time, the decreasing market segmentation widens the leeway 
for the realization of economies of scale (Siebert, 1989; 1990). A good indicator for the 
height of dynamic integration effects is the degree of intraindustry trade between the 
EU and the countries of the Visegrad-group because the reciprocal trade with similar 
products can above all be explained with the existence of market segmentations. 
Table  1 shows the Grubel-Lloyd-coefficients for trade between the EU and the 
Visegrad-group. As reference data, it also includes the degree of intraindustry trade 
within the EU and between the EFTA members and the EU. The closer the value of the 
Grubel-Lloyd-coefficient comes to 100, the higher is the intraindustry trade between the 
two trading partners.9 It is obvious that intraindustry trade between the countries of the 
Visegrad-group and the EU is rather significant. The Grubel-coefficient for all countries 
of the Visegrad-group is higher than that for the EU members Portugal, Greece, and 
Finland and the EFTA members Norway and Iceland. The degree of intraindustry trade 
between Hungary and the EU even comes close to the level of Denmark's and Ireland's 
intraindustry trade with EU partners. Thus, it can realistically be assumed that the 
countries of the Visegrad-group, with the exception of the Slovakian Republic, will gain 
rather than lose from a participation in the Internal Market Program. 
4.   Conclusions 
The considerations in this paper have shown that — from a pure welfare economic 
viewpoint  — there is no contradiction between a deepening and a widening of the 
European Union. However, it has also been shown that the factual degree of deepening 
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efforts by far exceeds the economically optimal one. Above all the Common 
Agriculture Policy, the Common Cohesion Policy, and the observable tendency towards 
a centralisation of economic competences raise high barriers for a full membership of 
Central and Eastern European countries in the EU. Thus, a full accession of the young 
market economies to the EU will only be possible after substantial institutional reforms 
have been made within the EU. To offer Central and Eastern European countries a 
better access to what can be called their 'natural' export market, the most advanced 
reform countries, such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia, should 
become members of the European Economic Area (EEA). With regard to the state of 
economic development in other Central and Eastern European countries such as 
Bulgaria, Romania, or the Baltic States, the hurdles erected by the basic norms of the 
Internal Market might be too high in case of a membership in the EEA. These countries 
should, therefore, become members of the EFTA. However, to provide incentives for 
further economic reforms, these countries should be assured that they are free to join the 
European Economic Area after they have reached a state of economic development 
which is similar to that of the Visegrad-group.   - 15 -






France 84  Austria  64 
United Kingdom  79  Italy  61 
Netherlands 78  Ireland  58 
Belgium/Luxemburg 77  Denmark  57 
Germany 77  Portugal  39 
Sweden 72  Finland  37 
Spain 67  Greece  27 
EFTA-Members 
Switzerland 79  Iceland  4 
Norway 35     
Visegrad-Group 

















 x 100 
where xi and mi are the exports and imports in category i. The closer the value of the Grubel-Lloyd-
coefficient comes to 100, the higher is the intraindustry trade between two trading partners. 
Source:  Commission of the European Communities, COMEXT Data Base; own 
calculations.   - 16 -
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